University of Dayton

eCommons
Philosophy Faculty Publications

Department of Philosophy

1996

Gestalt Shifts in Moral Perception
Peggy DesAutels
University of Dayton, pdesautels1@udayton.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://ecommons.udayton.edu/phl_fac_pub
Part of the History of Philosophy Commons
eCommons Citation
DesAutels, Peggy, "Gestalt Shifts in Moral Perception" (1996). Philosophy Faculty Publications. Paper 74.
http://ecommons.udayton.edu/phl_fac_pub/74

This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Philosophy at eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Philosophy Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of eCommons. For more information, please contact frice1@udayton.edu,
mschlangen1@udayton.edu.

Chapter 7
Gestalt Shifts in Moral Perception

Peggy DesAutels
Moral philosophers often assume that there are clear and unambiguous
single descriptions of particular moral situations, and thus they view their
primary task as that of determining the most moral action to take when in
these situations~ But surely there is less chance of there being a single and
final way to describe a given moral situation than there is of there being a
single and final way to organize and describe a visual display.'Although
we perceive many of our day-to-day moral experiences in an unreflective
and even reflexive manner, it is also possible for us to (and we often do)
"reperceive" moral situations. On one end of the spectrum, we can slightly
adjust our original perceptions by attending to details of moral significance
that were at first unnoticed. Or on the other end of the spectrum, we can
dramatically shift from our original perceptions to very different moral
perspectives or frameworks.
I argue in this chapter that gestalt shifts play a significant role in the
mental processes used to determine the moral saliencies of particular situations. I build on the recent debate between Carol Gilligan and Owen
Flanagan over the relevance of the gestalt-shift metaphor to the organization and reorganization of our moral perceptions (Gilligan 1987; Flanagan
and Jackson 1990; Gilligan and Attanucci 1988; and Flanagan 1991).
Throughout the course of this debate, neither of them directly referred to
important related issues found in philosophical and psychological discussions of perception.' I propose to place this debate within that broader
context and argue that a discussion of gestalt shifts in moral perception is
directly linked to the more general consideration of how it is that we
abstract from and draw meaning out of situations.' Connectionist models of
cognition, along with research on the role of tasks, metaphors, and analogies in perceptual mental processes, help answer the question, To what
degree and under what conditions do we experience gestalt shifts in the
organization of our moral perceptions?
Before continuing, it may be helpful to consider a specific example of a
gestalt shift in moral perception. Stephen R. Covey provides a dramatic
account of "re-seeing" moral saliencies in his best-seller, The Seven Habits of
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Highly Effective People. Although the description is rather extended, I include most of it. His setting of the scene and his description of how he
reframed the situation will be useful for further discussion and analysis:
I (Covey] remember a mini-paradigm shift I experienced one Sunday
morning on a subway in New York. People were sitting quietlysome reading newspapers, some lost in thought, some resting with
their eyes closed. It was a calm, peaceful scene.
Then suddenly, a man and his children entered the subway car.
The children were so loud and rambunctious that instantly the whole
climate changed.
The man sat down next to me and closed his eyes, apparently
oblivious to the situation. The children were yelling back and forth,
throwing things, even grabbing people's papers. It was very disturbing. And yet, the man sitting next to me did nothing.
It was difficult not to feel irritated. I could not believe that he
could be so insensitive as to let his children run wild like that and do
nothing about it, taking no responsibility at all. It was easy to see
that everyone else on the subway felt irritated, too. So finally, with
what I felt was unusual patience and restraint, I turned to him and
said, "Sir, your children are really disturbing a lot of people. I wonder
if you couldn't control them a little more?"
The man lifted his gaze as if to come to a consciousness of the
situation for the first time and said softly, uOh, you're right. I guess I
should do something about it. We just came from the hospital where
their mother died about an hour ago. I don't know what to think. and
I guess they don't know how to handle it either."
... Suddenly I saw things differently, and because I saw differently,
I thought differently, I felt differently, I behaved differently (Covey's
emphasis]. My irritation vanished. I didn't have to worry about controlling my attitude or my behavior; my heart was filled with the
man's pain. Feelings of sympathy and compas~ion flowed freely ....
Everything changed in an instant. (Covey 1989, 30-31)

Not~ tha~ Covey refers to this experience as a "mini-paradigm shift."
~y dISCUSSIOn of gestalt shifts in moral perception will certainly overlap
wIth recent discussions of "paradigm shifts" in scientific theories.! However, I refer to a shift in the organizing of a particular moral situation as a
gestalt shift to emphasize that not all shifts are as incommensurable as
Kuhn's paradigm shifts.
Some might argue that shifts in moral perception are few and far between, but I argue that gestalt shifts, are common and unavoidable, and
they playa significant role in the mental processes used to perceive particular moral situations. More specifically, I argue that gestalt shifts range
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from shifts between "unmergeable" or "rival" details of a perceived situation to shifts between entire organizing perspectives of a situation; and
these shifts play a significant role in the mental processes used to determine the moral saliencies of particular situations. I differentiate between
our more unreflective day-to-day moral perceptions (which incorporate
what I term framework shifts as a result of switching tasks) and our more
deliberative moral "perceptions" (which include both framework shifts and
what I term component shifts).

Gilligan: Shifts between Care and Justice Perspectives
Carol Gilligan, a moral psychologist, has focused much of her work on
differences in moral reasoning between male and female research participants. In her early studies, subjects were presented with short descriptions
of hypothetical dilemmas and then asked to reason morally about these
dilemmas. More recently, Gilligan has asked her subjects (both male and
female) to supply and describe their own examples of moral dilemmas. She
switched to soliciting real-life moral dilemmas in order to discover which
experiences the subjects themselves most viewed as moral dilemmas. As
a result of this work, Gilligan offers the following psychological moral
theory:
1) Concerns about justice and care are both represented in people's
thinking about real-life moral dilemmas, but people tend to focus on
one set of concerns and minimally represent the other; and 2) there is
an association between moral orientation and gender such that both
men and women use both orientations, but Care Focus dilemmas are
more likely to be presented by women and Justice Focus dilemmas
by men. (Gilligan and Attanucci 1988, 88)

Gilligan views unfairness-fairness and inequality-equality as those saliencies
most associated with the justice perspective, and attachment-detachment
and responsibility-irresponsibility as those saliencies most associated with
the care perspective (Gilligan 1987, 20). In the passage above, Gilligan
acknowledges that the same person may be able to organize moral experiences from either the justice or the care perspective, but she argues that
one perspective predominates. When we do view a particular situation
using both perspectives, Gilligan maintains that we shift between perspectives rather than organize that particular experience by at once combining
justice and care concerns.
I will not discuss the degree to which justice, or care, or both predominates in men's and women's overall moral orientations. Rather, I will
describe Gilligan's views on shifts. Gilligan compares the shift between
justice and care perspectives to visual gestalt shifts that take place when
viewing ambiguous figures. She writes:
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Like the figure-ground shift in ambiguous figure perception, justice
and care as moral perspectives are not opposites or mirror-images of
one another, with justice uncaring and care unjust.' Instead; these
perspectives denote different ways of organizing the basic elements
of moral judgment: self, others, and the relationship between them.\
(Gilligan 1987, 22)
Although admitting that more research needs to be done on "whether, for
example, people alternate perspectives, like seeing the rabbit and the duck
in the rabbit-duck figure, or integrate the two perspectives in a way that
resolves or sustains ambiguity" (Gilligan 1987, 26), she does argue that we
, vacillate between rather than integrate the justice and care perspectives.
She refers to the "focus phenomenon," whereby subjects lose sight of one
group of potential saliencies (justice saliencies) and focus instead on another group (care saliencies) in moral perception. \,.
Gilligan's evidence for the contention that we shift between perspectives that are "not readily integratable" is garnered from research subjects'
verbal descriptions of moral situations. Subjects were deemed to have
switched perspectives when the terms they used in one analysis of the
moral dilemma did not contain the terms of another analysis of the same
dilemma. She refers to the doctoral research of Kay Johnston in which
children and teenagers were presented with a moral dilemma in fable form.
According to Johnston, about half the children "spontaneously switched
moral orientations" (they switched terminology) when asked if there was
another way to "solve the problem" (Gilligan 1987, 26-27).
It is worth noting that Gilligan leaves room for the possibility that there
are more than two moral orientations when she refers to "at least two
moral orientations" (Gilligan 1987, 26, my emphasis). She does not, however, conjecture on the nature or composition of any additional moral
perspectives beyond care and justice.

Flanagan: Integrated Moral Perceptions
Owen Flanagan takes a more interdisciplinary approach to moral cognition
and brings recent advances in cognitive science, moral theory, and psychology to bear on the issues surrounding moral perception. In his discussion of Gilligan's two perspectives, Flanagan primarily wishes to take issue
with the degree to which persons have a dominant orientation, but he also
objects to certain aspects of Gilligan's use of the gestalt-shift metaphor. He
describes three ways in which the metaphor is helpful and even illuminating but follows this discussion with three ways in which it is "unhelpful
and misleading" (Flanagan 1991, 214). His primary objections to the metaphor are: (1) "Not all moral issues are so open to alternative construals";
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(2) "Moral consideration, unlike visual perception, takes place over time

and can involve weighing as much, and as messy, information as we like";
and (3)'''The metaphor calls attention to the gross features of moral perception [but] much of what is most interesting and individually distinctive
about moral personality lies in the small details of what is noticed, deliberated about, and acted on" (Flanagan 1991,214-217). ,
.
In the following sections, I bring recent developments in cognitive
science to this discussion of the role of gestalt shifts in organizing moral
experience.

Gestalt Shifts
I do not limit the definition of a gestalt shift to examples of completely
polar and/or incommensurable organizations. Rather I include any two
mental organizations that cannot be merged into one (or are incompatible
in some way), no matter how much these two organizations may have in
common. Another way to put this is to use the visual focus metaphor.
When one set of saliencies comes into focus, most members of that set (but
not necessarily all) go out of focus when the competing set of saliencies
comes into focus. The duck-rabbit image (figure 7.1) is a more extreme
example of a visual image that can result in our experiencing two distinct
and incompatible perceptions. When we see the duck. we do not see the
rabbit; and after switching to seeing the rabbit, we do not see the duck.
However, images with figure-ground ambiguities can also result in the
experience of a gestalt shift (figure 7.2). In figure-ground shifts, there is

Figure 7.1
Duck-rabbit ambiguous figure. From Mind Sights by Roger N. Shepard. Copyright © 1990
by Roger N . Shepard. Reprinted with permission of W. H. Freeman and Company.
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Figure 7.2
Figure-ground ambiguity. From Mind Sights by Roger N. Shepard. Copyright © 1990 by
Roger N. Shepard. Reprinted with permission of W. H. Freeman and Company.

more of an emphasis on refocusing, where background becomes foreground and foreground becomes background, rather than an emphasis on
incompatible and completely distinct figure interpretations. 2 Gilligan and I
define gestalt shifts as incorporating both incompatible figures and figureground ambiguities, whereas Flanagan emphasizes more the view that
gestalt shifts (and thus gestalt shift metaphors) necessarily include a more
radical figure incommensurability.
The experience of a gestalt shift in moral perception mayor may not be
provoked by an external stimulus. Just as it can be mentioned to someone
"stuck" seeing only a rabbit that the image can also be seen as a duck (and
the "bill" of the duck can even be directly pointed to), so can someone
supply new information that encourages the reperceiving of a moral situation. Covey's shift, for example, was preceded by new information from
the man in the subway. But one could also imagine Covey's reperceiving
the situation with no external stimulus. For instance, he could have suddenly noticed that these children were behaving similarly to children he
had observed previously at a parent's funeral service.
When a shift in moral perception is preceded by an external stimulus,
there is a sense in which the'situation itself has changed~I wish to emphasize, however, that gestalt shifts can occur even when the "input" to a
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perception changes to some degree.IGestalt shifts occur in such cases
when the new piece of perceptual input is not simply added on or incorporated into the original perception; rather, at least some of the original
perceptual input array is mentally reorganized.'
It is also important to this discussion to distinguish between a framework gestalt shift and a component gestalt shift (hereafter referred to as
framework shift and component shift). What I term a framework shift
involves (1) a mental switch from one way of organizing an entire experience to a different way of organizing that experience and (2) some sense in
which the two ways of organizing the experience are incompatible-in
other words, the two overall organizations cannot be merged into a single
overall organization. The duck-rabbit switch would be a framework shift if
the duck-rabbit image filled our entire viewing screen as it were-if the
duck-rabbit image comprised our perceptual experience.
On the other hand, what I term a component shift involves (1) a mental
shift from one way of organizing a detail (component) of an experience to
a different way of organizing that detail, and (2) some sense in which the
two ways of organizing that detail of experience are incompatible. A
visual example of a component shift is the shift that would occur when
viewing the duck-rabbit image as part of a larger scene. For instance, we
may see a person wearing a t-shirt with many patterns on it, one of which
is the duck-rabbit pattern. The overall organization of the scene remains
the same (a person wearing a t-shirt with patterns on it), but a detail in the
scene shifts. For the purposes of this discussion, then, a gestalt shift occurs
whenever the perceiver shifts between the deployment of one alreadyexisting organizing mental structure to the deployment of another
already-existing organizing structure in the perceiving of at least some
(if not all) of a particular situation or experience.
Moral perceptions can involve either framework or component shifts.
For example, we could continue to frame a particular woman's abortion
dilemma around the status of the fetus (rather than reorganizing the frame
around the relationship of that woman to the fetus) but shift between
viewing the fetus first as an unborn child and then as a simple growth.
Such a shift would be a component shift in moral perception. With these
clarifications in mind, let us move on to consider when and under what
conditions gestalt shifts in moral perception are most likely to take place.

Tasks and Gestalt Shifts in Moral Perception
As we go about our daily lives, it only makes sense that our current tasks
would heavily influence which of all possible perceptual organizations
(possible for us with the learning history that each of us has) is actually
brought online. If there is something we are trying to accomplish, we will
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notice and abstract out those aspects of our experience that most help us
to achieve our objective. Our days are filled with such tasks as fulfilling
job requirements, running errands, getting x done, solving problem y, and
so on.
Neither Gilligan nor Flanagan directly addresses the relationship between task switching and gestalt shifts in moral perception. In this section,
I argue that in our more unreflective day-to-day moral perceptions, an
important relationship exists between switching tasks and gestalt shifts in
moral perception. The obvious result of acknowledging this relationship is
the additional acknowledgment that there are many more gestalt shifts in
our day-to-day moral perceptions than either Gilligan or Flanagan postulates and many of these shifts are between perceptual organizations other
than the justice-care organizations.
An inherent difficulty in analyzing the relationship between perceptual
organizations and tasks is that of determining the best level of description
for particular tasks. A task can be described at any number of levels of
generality or complexity. To keep this discussion of tasks simple, I describe someone as engaged in a particular task (mental or otherwise) if it
makes sense that the person would describe herself as currently engaged in
that task if asked (for example, "What are you doing right now?" ''I'm
trying to figure out what's fair.")
In Varieties of Moral Personality, Flanagan relates the perceptual process
of abstracting out certain features of a situation to a person's current task.
He specifies two main types of abstraction: feature detection (or classificatory abstraction) and task-guided abstraction. These two main types of
abstraction are not mutually exclusive mental processes but interact in
complex ways. He defines feature detection as involving "the cognitive
isolation or recognition of just those properties (sometimes called essential
properties) which warrant classifying some token as a member of a type
or kind" (83-84). He defines task-guided abstraction as the deployment
of rationalized procedures that "warrant paying differential attention, and
giving differential treatment, to various features of an object, event, or
situation" in order to complete a given task successfully (85). All kinds of
abstraction involve highlighting or separating out the features of some
thing or event that bring it under the correct cognitive description relative
to its actual nature and the aims of the person doing the abstracting.
Task-guided abstraction goes further and involves deployment of rationalized procedures deemed appropriate to the successful completion of the
task at hand. These procedures warrant paying differential attention, and
giving differential treatment, to various features of an object, event, or
situation.' My point is this: to the degree that our perceptions are task
guided, we will shift our perceptions and the organized saliencies of our
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perceptions when we shift tasks. Thus, switches to significantly diffe~nt
tasks will often involve what I consider to be gestalt shifts in perception.
Of course, not all task switches precipitate shifts in moral perception.
Since neither mowing my lawn nor raking the cuttings is likely to include
the perception of any moral saliencies, it is highly unlikely that switching
from mowing to raking will result in a gestalt shift in moral perception. So
it is important at this point to examine what kinds of day-to-day tasks and
task switches most affect moral perceptions. Clearly, switching between
ostensibly "moral" tasks will be most likely to affect moral perceptions.
For example, switching from the task of determining what is most fair to
that of determining what is most caring may well result in our reorganizing
our experience.3 Most of us are not engaged in self-described moral
tasks much of the time. We may live by such high-level moral goals as
that of responding morally when it is called for, but the specific task of responding morally may be initiated only intermittently in our day-to-day
experience.
This is not to say that we do not make moral judgments and determine
moral saliencies unless engaged in a self-described moral task. In fact, any
task that includes interactions with others will often incorporate the making of moral judgments, assessments, or both. The most obvious day-today task likely to involve moral perceptions is our "job."4 For instance,
the moral qualities of those who most determine our job success will often
be the qualities of most salience to us throughout our workday.
To illustrate, while engaged in solving a problem at work with a colleague, I am most likely to organize my perceptual experience around the
obstacles and means to solving this work-related problemhf my colleague
is preventing the project from proceeding, I view this colleague as "difficult"
(at best), and all of her personality faults become highly salient in my
experience. However, I may also have a high-level goal of treating others
with compassion when they are "in need." Even in the middle of an
intense, work-related discussion, I may notice something out of sorts with
my colleague, "interrupt" my foreground work-related task, and initiate
my "treat others with compassion" moral task. 5 As a result, I switch to
reperceiving the saliencies in my colleague's behavior most important to
my responding with compassion. In this case, the shift in my moral perceptions is tied to my switching from an ostensibly "nonmoral" task (which
nonetheless incorporates moral perceptions) to a "moral" task. t
I can also switch, for example, from a more general moral task of
attempting to determine the most fair thing to do in a situation to the
more specific moral task of seeing things from another person's point of
view. This switch from a general to a more specific moral task also results
in reorganizing the moral saliencies of the situation at hand.
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Even Gilligan's examples of shifting from the justice to the care perspective can be viewed as switching between the moral task of determining
what is most fair and the moral task of determining what is most caring.
Certainly some may not wish to describe this change in orientation as so
closely intertwined with a task switch. There are surely other ways to
describe the reorientation, but viewing the shift as tied to task switching
accomplishes two objectives:'(l) I emphasize that the perceiver's goals and
activities have much more relevance to the perceived moral saliencies of a
situation than most others have presumed, and (2) I deemphasize the role
of inherent aspects of a situation itself and emphasize instead how much of
moral perception is directed by the perceiver. 6"~ In our day-to-day lives,
different and competing saliencies occur primarily because we switch to
different tasks with their accompanying different objectives.
Covey's mini-paradigm shift described at the beginning of this chapter
could also be viewed as tied to his switching from the moral task of
determining what would bring most peace and harmony to the passengers
on the subway to the moral task of determining what would bring most
comfort and compassion to the family whose mother had just died. There
may have been others on the subway car who were entirely focused on
their own tasks of whatever sort and thus failed to notice anything other
than the fact that there were some loud but ignorable children in the
"background." Interestingly, it could even be argued that Covey experienced two gestalt shifts. The first was the shift in perception tied to his
switching from a nonmoral reading task to the moral task of helping to
bring about peace and quiet on the car, and the second was the shift tied to
his switching to a distinctly different moral task of responding compassionately to a grieving family.

Past Experience, Analogies, Metaphors, and Connectionist Prototypes
Although switching tasks plays a significant role in day-to-day shifts in
moral perception, it can also be argued that switching analogies, metaphors, and even concepts while engaged in an overtly moral task (such as
moral deliberation or moral reflection) also results in gestalt shifts in moral
perception. Chalmers, French, and Hofstadter (1992) describe "high-level
perceptual processing" (involving the drawing of meaning out of situations) as consisting of a complex interaction between the process of making analogies ("mapping one's situation to another") and the process of
perceiving the situation ("filtering and organizing [datal in various ways to
provide an appropriate representation for a given context") (192-195).
Although they do not directly address either moral perception or gestalt
shifts in perception, they note that there can be "rival analogies." For
example, we can shift between viewing Saddam Hussein as being like
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Hitler and viewing him as being like Robin Hood, a "generous figure
redistributing the wealth of the Kuwaitis to the rest of the Arab population" (199). It is doubtful that Americans would make such a shift spontaneously. We would have very little incentive to shift analogies in order to
view Hussein as Robin Hood unless we made it our moral task, for example, to understand how his own people view him.
Connectionist models of the mind and perception also imply that we
can experience gestalt-like shifts when our task becomes that of better
understanding a situation. Churchland's analysis of "conceptual change
versus conceptual redeployment" is of direct relevance to a discussion
of gestalt shifts. He describes "conceptual redeployment" as "a process
in which a conceptual framework that is already fully developed, and in
regular use in some other domain of experience or comprehension, comes
to be used for the first time in a new domain" (Churchland 1989, 237).
Churchland gives the example of Huygens's applying his already welldeveloped "wave" conceptual framework to his understanding of light for
the first time.
What is not clear in Churchland's account is how often and under what
circumstances we "conceptually redeploy" in our deliberations and everyday lives. Many day-to-day gestalt shifts in perception are precipitated by
the conscious switching of tasks, but there is also no doubt that sudden
and unexplainable framework shifts periodically occur in our lives. If we
conceive of conceptual redeployments merely as spontaneous framework
shifts, redeployments seem few and far between. On the other hand,
conscious switching to a rival analogy or a different metaphor should also
count as conceptual redeployments. If so, we "conceptually redeploy"
quite regularly. Both framework and component shifts in moral perception
can be viewed in connectionist terms as switching between the activation
of one moral prototype to the activation of a different (and in some way
incompatible) prototype in order to make sense of particular situations.
Churchland does briefly examine the relationship of his connectionist
model of the mind to moral theory. His description of what occurs in
moral argument closely parallels my emphasis on gestalt shifts in moral
perception. For Churchland, moral argument takes place when situations
are ambiguous and "consists in trying to reduce the exaggerated salience
of certain features of the situation, and to enhance the salience of certain
others, in order to change which prototype gets activated" (Church land
1989,300).

Another interesting consequence of viewing knowledge as prototypical
(in a connectionist sense of the word) is that we come to see knowledge as
much more context dependent. In other words, the representations that
lade our perceptions are context-dependent representations. Andy Clark
expands on this notion when he writes,
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Fodor-style classicists were seen to picture the mind as manipulatillg
context-free symbolic structures in a straight-forwardly composi_
tional manner.
Connectionists, not having context-free analogues to conceptUal_
level items available to them, have to make do with a much mOre
slippery and hard-to-control kind of "compositionality" which cOn_
sists in the mixing together of context-dependent representations.
(Clark 1993, 25)
To illustrate what is meant by a context-dependent representation, Clark
refers to Smolensky's "infamous coffee case." We experience coffee in a
variety of contexts (liquid coffee in a cup, ground coffee in a can, and So
on), and Clark argues that as a result, we do not have a single representa_
tion for coffee; rather, we have many different "coffee" representations.
In connectionist terminology, a "coffee" representation comprises a Set
of activation patterns in the hidden units; 'these patterns vary becaUse
the contexts varied in which the net was "trained up" on coffee (Clark'
1993, 24).

-~/ ("

In the light of my definition of a gestalt shift, switching from one
context-dependent representation of "coffee" to another context-depen_
dent representation of "coffee" is tantamount to a gestalt shift. After all, it
is a shift between two incompatible and "unmerge able" mental structures.
We cannot unify our various coffee activation patterns into one allpurpose pattern but must switch between differing context-dependent
mental structures depending on the context in which we are deploying the
coffee concept. Nonetheless, it is important to reemphasize that there are
degrees to which we shift between representations as \ve attempt to draw
meaning out of a situation.lThese range from framework shifts (where a
new and complex "wave" prototype is brought to bear on Huygens'
perception of "light") to component shifts (where in a deliberation over a
situation involVing coffee, the perceiver can bring one of several coffee
activation patterns to bear on the situation). It is interesting to note that
even "coffee" can be tied to a moral perception. We could, for example, be
engaged in the moral task of determining whether our being addicted to
coffee is harmful to others. As we deliberate over this "addiction situation," we may shift between the activation of various context-dependent
"coffee" representations.
The pervasiveness of gestalt shifts in connectionist models of the mind
can also be illuminated by conSidering recent work of Mark Rollins on the
plasticity of perception.' He emphasizes plasticity in use or the strategy
ladenness of perceptual knowledge and points out that much of our perceptual experience incorporates strategies having to do with which of our
already-existing concepts to deploy in a given situation. 'He writes that
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"plasticity-in-use is important because
effectiveness of content even if not in
Once again, the point can be made that
use, whenever we redeploy concepts,
manner in our perceiving of a situation.
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it can produce a change in the
content itself" (Rollins 1994, 42).
whenever we restrategize content
we have shifted in a gestalt-like

Flanagan Revisited
With the knowledge that switching between tasks, analogies, metaphors,
and even contextualized concepts will result in gestalt shifts in our perceptions, it is worth reexamining Flanagan's objections to the gestalt shift
metaphor.' His first concern is that "not all moral issues are open to alternative construals" (Flanagan 1991, 214). But I have stressed that the experiencing of gestalt shifts in moral perception is not determined primarily by
the nature of the situation.'Rather, in our more unreflective day-to-day
moral perceptions, shifts are often tied to task switches. In our more
deliberative moral "perceptions," we can attempt a different perspective on
any moral issue by attempting to see the situation "through someone
else's eyes" or by applying a different analogy or metaphor'
Flanagan's second objection to the gestalt-shift metaphor is that "moral
consideration, unlike visual perception, takes place over time and can involve weighing as much, and as messy, information as we like" (215).
However, as I have pointed out, even moral deliberation or consideration
over time of a particular situation may incorporate mental structures that
conflict and cannot be merged into single "messy" mental entities. We
cannot weigh and then merge as much, and as messy, information as we
like when the information comes in context-dependent pieces.'
Flanagan stresses that perceptions involving cognition and deliberation
result in "all-things-considered judgments" (communication with Flanagan
1994). I agree that a deliberative moral perceiver has an ability to weigh
alternatives and then arrive at an "all-things-considered" perspective on a
situation. My point here is that even this consideration process will often
involve shifting between gestalt-like, context-dependent mental structures.
In other words, deliberative moral perceptions often involve selecting
from various incompatible organizing structures rather than constructing a
single "best" perspective using fine-grained, context-free mental elements.
Flanagan appears to assume that moral deliberation consists in the manipulation of and recomposition of context-free representations, but connectionist models of mind give us no such fine-grained, context-free mental
elements with which to "build" moral perceptions.
Flanagan's final concern is that the gestalt shift metaphor "calls attention
to the gross features of moral perception [but that] much of what is most
interesting and individually distinctive about moral personality lies in the
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small details of what is noticed, deliberated about, and acted on" (Flanagan
1991, 217). While what I term framework shifts stress the larger-grained
overall organization of moral perception, there remain finely detailed and
richly articulated saliencies within each framework. Shifts in and of themselves make no difference to the content of what we shift from or to.
For example, when we shift to a rival analogy, we still have all the richness and detail of that analogy cognitively available. I have also argued
throughout this chapter that not all shifts are framework shifts; many
gestalt shifts are, rather, component shifts in how we view particular
details. In many moral situations involving several actors, for example, we
may not reframe the entire situation but shift significantly in our view of
one of the "players."

Conclusion
This discussion has linked moral perception with gestalt shifts by showing
how we bring already-existing mental structures to bear on situations.
Altering our perceptions by shifting between already-existing mental
structures does not by any means comprise all of perceptual cognitionmoral or otherwise. After all, much of learning involves the altering
of previously existing mental structures and the creating of new mental
structures. And much of moral thought involves reasoning-using the
perceived saliencies of a situation as "input" to higher-level, traditionally
rational mental processes. But it should also be clear that much of perceptual cognition itself-the drawing of meaning from situations-incorporates the application of various of our already-in-place concepts and
conceptual organizations.
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Notes
1. For more on the related philosophy of science discussion of gestalt shifts, see Wright
(1992).
2. Marilyn Frye (1983) proposes this type of figure-ground refocusing, for example, in

situations where men have been viewed as the main actors and women as "stagehands"
in the background; we can refocus these scenes so that the men recede and the women
come into focus .
3. Switching from determining what is most fair to determ ining what is most caring may
or may not result in our reorganizing our experience. If, for example, what is most fair
also turns out to be what is most caring, it may be that no reorganization occurs. For
more on how the concepts of justice and care can overlap, see Friedman (1987).
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4. Sara Ruddick (1989) has similarly argued that the day-to-day work of mothers deter-

mines the kind of moral thinking they do.
5. My use of computer-task terminology here is not meant to convey a flippant attitude
toward moral cognition. I take morality and the living of a moral life very seriously.
6. Since discussions of moral perception are often linked to discussions of moral realism, I
should mention that I am neither a moral realist nor do I think that cognitive scientists
and/or ethical theorists provide any compelling reasons for being so.
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